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Abstract. The Massive Ordnance Penetrator(MOP) has been 
developed to destroy deeply buried nuclear components by 
controlled release from a B2 or B52 airplane. This type of release 
must be cockpit software controlled by the Tactical Optimal 
Strategy Game(TOSG) Protocol to optimally determine the war 
game aspects of the dueling from other countries' MOP releases, 
and the depth at which the MOP explosions can occur for 
maximal safety and risk concerns. The TOSG Protocol 
characteristics of games of strategy, games of optimal strategy 
and tactical games are defined initially by the game of strategy as 
a certain series of events, each of which must have a finite 
number of distinct results. The outcome of a game of strategy, in 
some cases, depends on chance. All other events depend on the 
free decision of the players. A game has a solution if there exist 
two strategies, which become optimal strategies when each 
mathematically attains the value of the game. The TOSG 
Protocol war game tactical problem for a class of games can be 
mathematically modeled as a combat between two airplanes, each 
carrying a MOP as the specification of the accuracy of the firing 
machinery and the total amount of ammunition that each plane 
carries. This silent duel occurs, because each MOP bomber is 
unable to determine the number of times its opponent has missed. 
The TOSG Protocol realizes a game theory solution of the tactical 
optimal strategy game utilizing the theory of games of timing, 
games of pursuit, games of time lag, games of sequence, games of 
maneuvering, games of search, games of positioning and games of 
aiming and evasion. The geometric software structure for the 
TOSG Protocol is a game tree identifying the possible depth of 
explosions.  This finite game tree with a distinguished vertex is 
embedded in an oriented plane to facilitate the definition of a 
strategy as a geometric model of the character of a game for the 
successive presentation of alternatives. The tactical optimal 
strategy determination by the TOSG Protocol Cockpit Software 
is mandatory for the execution of the correct and maximally 
effective MOP release by the MOP bomber. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
The Massive Ordnance Penetrator(MOP) GBU-57A/B[8] 
is the most powerful bunker buster, a 13,000 kilogram weapon,  
developed by the United States to be used against tunnel 
imbedded nuclear devices. The MOP can smash through 20 
meters of reinforced concrete before exploding. The MOP uses 
a Hard Target Smart Fuse [14] that allows detonation inside 
buried or reinforced concrete targets. The detonation occurs by 
the fuse after a sensor informs the fuse that a weapon has 
passed through a number of layers or voids in the target. The 
MOP will be fired by a B2 or B52 Airplane[8]. 
The unique formal TOSG(Tactical Optimal Strategy 
Game) Protocol Cockpit Software Control for MOP Release is  
mathematically defined to assist the MOP bomber’s actions. 
The TOSG Protocol is comprised of three topological models; 
Model 1 two airplanes with MOP explosives as a Two Person 
Zero-Sum game [18,23], Model 2 airplane MOP gunner aiming 
and evasion game[10,11] to fire the MOP at a tunnel, and 
Model 3 the games of timing to predict timing of the MOP 
airplane gunner firing[26]. A class of games which are tactical 
will represent a contest between two players who are trying to 
obtain the same objective. This tactical game has a solution if 
there exists two strategies, which are optimal strategies[23] if 
the integration of their derivative times a function equals the 
values of the game. The game of strategy consists of a certain 
series of events, each of which must have a finite number of 
distinct results[29]. The resource allocation optimization for the 
TOSG Protocol Management is based on the Theory of Games 
of Timing to achieve an optimal strategy and optimal timing 
interval. The optimized process follows a timing chart or 
message sequence of timed events that must have the timing to 
be optimized for each process. The first optimal strategy, 
within the Games of Timing Kernel[7,26]equation achieves the 
TOSG Protocol optimal strategy and optimal timing intervals 
and the second optimal strategy makes an Optimal Strategy 
Decision from the TOSG Protocol Risk Optimization equation 
within the Kernel of the Games of Timing equation.  
 
II.TOSG PROTOCOL WAR GAME PROCESS 
1. Tactical Game Zero-Sum Two-Person Game(MODEL 1) 
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The Tactical Game[23] definition for the TOSG Protocol 
begins with a Zero-Sum Two-Person Game [18]. Zero-Sum 
means that the gain of one player is matched by the loss of the 
other player. In a game the following three observations are 
given for each player: (a) certain choices available, (b) 
knowledge of consequences of the choices for each choice of 
opponent, and (c) choice must be made independent of 
knowledge of the opponent’s decision. There is then a single 
payoff function, because of only one strategy for each player. 
The game is defined by the triplet Γ = (X,Y,Ψ) where X and Y 
are two closed  sets and Ψ is a real valued, measurable function 
defined on XxY; Ψ is called the payoff or utility function. The 
elements xєX and yєY are called pure strategies; the positive 
measures with total measure 1 defined over X and Y are called 
mixed strategies. The game has a solution if there exist two 
strategies F(x) and G(y) such that, 
 
        ∫ Ψ(x,y) dF(x) ≥ V,  all y є Y                                           (1) 
        ∫ Ψ(x,y) dG(y) ≥ V, all x є X                                            (2) 
 
F and G are Optimal Strategies and V is the value of the game. 
Each game will represent a contest between two players each 
trying to obtain the same objective. When one of the players 
succeeds, it will win one unit; the opponent loses the same 
amount, and the contest is over[23]. Each player has limited 
resources and can make only a fixed number of attempts to 
reach the goal. These attempts must be made during the 
interval 0 ≤  t ≤ 1, and each attempt may fail or succeed.  At t = 
0 every attempt fails; at t = 1 every attempt succeeds. At any 
other time an attempt made by player 1 will be successful with 
probability P(t), and will fail with probability 1- P(t). An 
attempt by player 2 succeeds with probability Q(t) and fails 
with probability 1- Q(t). The functions P(t) and Q(t) increase 
continuously. Each player knows these functions and the total 
number of attempts that its opponent can make.  
After the contest begins each player is unable to determine 
how many unsuccessful attempts have been made by the 
opponent. This specialize form of combat or War Game 
between two airplanes P and Q, each carrying MOPs describes 
the accuracy of the firing machinery and the initial resources 
related to the total amount of ammunition that each player can 
carry, i.e., the B2 Airplane currently can carry 2 MOPs, and the 
B52 Airplane can currently carry 6 MOPs[8]. This problem is 
often called a silent duel, because it is assumed that each pilot 
is unable to find out how many times the opponent has fired 
and has missed[23]. In the formal description of the game x and 
y will be vectors that describe the times when the attempts will 
be made and Ψ(x,y) will be the expected gain for player 1. 
 
1.A. Gain For Two Person Zero Sum Game Players[18] 
The gain Ψ(x,y) for the MOP bomber[18,23] is stated 
when it uses strategy x and the opponent nuclear device in the 
tunnel uses strategy y, (x є X, y є Y). Then because of the Zero 
Sum definition, Ψ(x,y) < 0 (MOP bomber loses).  Ψ(x,y) = gain 
or loss to the nuclear device in the tunnel opponent. The use of 
mixed or optimal strategy could also be useful for a more 
exacting development of traits if the single payoff function did 
not yield the expected result. One of the traits would then 
enforce the development of how each pure strategy could be 
optimally used. The further formalism for mixed strategies 
redefines the  parameters as; 
X = MOP bomber m pure strategies = times when attempts are 
made to fire the MOP = probability vector σ(X) э there exists, 
σ(x1),- - - -,σ(xm),  
Y = opponent nuclear weapon in tunnel n pure strategies = 
probability vector τ (Y) э there exists, τ(y1), - - - - τ(yn),  
        ψ(σ,τ)  =   ∑      ∑     σ(x)τ(y)ψ(x,y)                                (3) 
                       xєX    yєY 
Then, the Game Solution for mixed strategies σo and τo  э v = 
ψ(σo ,τo) , ψ(σo,τ) ≥  ψ(σo,τo) ≥  ψ(σ,τo) for  all σ є X, τ є Y. The 
most optimal plan of action for each of the two players is to try 
to maximize their respective payoff functions.  Since the Zero 
Sum Two Person Sum Game is assumed, the most positive 
outcome for the MOP bomber must be determined with the 
following steps[18], 
 
(1) The MOP bomber’s opponent tries to minimize its average 
gain, so the bomber is assured of   min ψ(x,y) , 
                                                        xєX 
(2) The MOP bomber’s choice of action must be made such 
that its payoff will be at least,   max   min  ψ(x,y) , 
                                                   xєX   yєY 
 (3) The payoff  to the opponent is the negative of the MOP 
bomber’s payoff, so for any pure strategy y that the opponent 
choses,  
                    min(- ψ(x, y) )  =  - max(ψ(x, y))                         (4) 
                    xєX                         xєX 
(4) The MOP bomber can then obtain a payoff of at least  
max  min ψ(x,y) or no more than  min  max ψ(x,y), where, 
xєX  yєY                                         yєY  xєX 
                            max  min ψ(x,y)  ≤  min   max ψ(x,y)          (5) 
                            xєX  yєY                  yєY  xєX 
The modeling of the MOP bomber’s experiences by the game 
theory formulation will enable the MOP bomber to visualize 
the risk issues as a consequence of judgments based on 
experience rather than as an issue composed of a maximum 
certainty of personal loss. An N Person Game model[18] is also 
possible for the MOP bomber in reference to other problems, if 
there are multiple players.  However from the basic Two 
Person Zero Sum Game model the baseline for the majority of 
situations has been provided. 
 
2. TOSG Protocol Cockpit Software Aiming And Evasion 
Game Theory (MODEL 2) 
The aiming and evasion game theory[10,11] uses a gunner, 
marksman, or MOP bomber aboard the B2 Airplane or the B52 
Airplane firing the MOP at the tunnel location, with a time lag 
in the MOP gunner’s target position in the tunnel. This game 
theory formulation realizes that the nuclear device will be 
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moved deeper into the tunnel, how and when the marksman 
should make its prediction and the hit probability. The 
marksman has an ideal strategy with the property that every 
near optimal strategy is close to it. One of the most classic of 
military problems is how best to aim at a mobile target, which 
is deliberately maneuvering to confound prediction of the 
position, i.e., the burying deeper of the nuclear weapons in the  
tunnel. How best will the target maneuver the crucial features 
in common, i.e. the time lag between detection of the target and 
arrival of the projectile.  The time lag could be composed of , 
(1) delay between detection of the target and aiming of the 
firing device, and (2) the flight time of the projectile itself. The 
lag will be time lag as a whole, a mixed strategy. When the 
player of a game employs a mixed strategy, it means the 
decision is not made in accordance with any predetermined 
certain plan, but involves a certain amount of  randomness. 
A game theoretic solution prescribes, but does not dictate 
behavior, and the exact probabilities to respectively minimize 
or maximize the probability of a hit. If the target were to follow 
any prescribed certain plan, it would plainly be a ruinous policy 
as soon as the MOP gunner became aware of it. Any fixed 
policy of the MOP gunner would enable the target always to 
escape once the MOP gunner learned the policy[11]. The goal 
should be for an optimal mixed strategy or policies of best 
regulated randomness for each player. A sunken nuclear device  
is aware of an enemy MOP bomber’s presence, but the airplane 
is too high for precise detection. The tunnel nuclear device is 
interested only in not being hit. The device has no offensive 
means. The airplane has one or more MOP’s and to avoid 
extraneous factors it is assumed the MOP bombers aim is 
perfect. The nuclear device in the tunnel knows nothing about 
when or where the MOP will be dropped after detonation. .The 
nuclear device can only maneuver to be deposited deeper to 
minimize the hit probability. The only kinematic restriction is 
that the nuclear device travels with a fixed speed of v. There is 
a time lag T between the MOP bomber’s last information about 
the depth of the nuclear device in the tunnel and the detonation. 
Thus the MOP bomber must aim at an anticipated depth of the 
nuclear device in the tunnel. 
3. TOSG Protocol Game Tree Cockpit Software Structure 
The game theory attempts to answer three questions: (1) 
the optimal strategy of player 1, i.e. the continued changing of 
the depth of the nuclear device in the tunnel, (2) the optimal 
strategy of player 2, i.e. when and where should the MOP 
bomber strike, (3) the value of the game, i.e. what is the hit 
probability when both players use the best tactics. Therefore, 
the TOSG Protocol Geometric Cockpit Software Structure 
realizing these questions is the TOSG Protocol Game 
Tree[6,15] in Figure 1.  The enduring strategy established for 
the Game Tree realizes that each decision depends on the prior 
moves.  This Game Tree will ensure that the MOP Bomber(P) 
achieves a near optimal strategy. This Game Tree Model is 
based on a game theory model [10,11] where there was a 
bomber aiming at a target that was a battleship. The 1,2,3 are 
vertical positions in the TOSG Protocol Models that represent 
positions of the nuclear device(E) in the tunnel. The 
probabilities of E reaching each of the vertical positions 1, 2, 3, 
each deeper in the tunnel are: (1-x)
2
, x , x(1-x).  According to 
game theory P will elect the largest of these three probabilities 
for the calculation of the detonation location for the firing of 
the MOP. The best possible x for E is the value that renders the 
maximum of the three polynomials a minimum at V, the value 
of the game, a root of x = (1-x)
2
, i.e., V = .382. Therefore, for 
any є > 0 there is a mixed strategy which assures P, a MOP 
firing hit with probability ≥ V – є, described as a near optimal 
strategy, an є strategy, where P can attain at most V. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. TOSG Protocol Game Tree Geometric Cockpit   Software Structure 
 
 
III. TECHNICAL RISKS AND PROGRAMMATIC RISKS 
FOR DECISION OPIMIZATION 
Key technical risks are developed for the constraints in a 
TOSG Protocol equation realizing multiple sensors detecting 
voids in the target communicating with a Simulation Facility. 
Risk is defined as the chance that a particular decision or 
action can give rise to a variety of outcomes for which the 
mathematical probability can be calculated [3,13].  Therefore, 
the programmatic risk is the integration of the Decision 
Optimization solution containing the constraint values. Risk is 
defined economically by the following equation[13], 
                                RISK = T x V x C                                  (6) 
T = threat, the frequency of potentially adverse events and 
protection of goals, V = vulnerability, the likelihood of 
success of a particular organization, C = cost is the total 
impact of a particular threat exercised by a vulnerable target. 
The mathematical probabilistic mitigating risk equation is 
the following: 
                      RISK = (Pa)(1- Pe)(Ce)                             (7) 
Pa = the probability of attack from the analysis of threat based 
on intelligence of the threat, current security environment[13] 
and other information to arrive at some indications of an event 
at worst case = 1.0. Use a value for likelihood of attack Pa 
other than the assumed worst case value of 1.0 to be used to 
help discriminate among the target set. Pe = system 
effectiveness is the product of Pi and Pn. Pi is the probability 
of interruption indicating how effective the protective system 
is in interrupting an adversary attack,  Pn = the probability of 
neutralization, how well response measures do in force-on-
force conflicts with the adversary given interruption. Ce = 
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consequence of an event including prioritized targets. The risk 
of surface damage from the detonation of the MOP in the  
tunnel is discussed in the research on the Defense 
Cover[16,17] and the Side Effect Risks [22]. 
 
IV. INVARIANT IMBEDDING OF TOSG PROTOCOL 
EQUATION WITHIN GAMES OF TIMING KERNEL 
The invariant imbedding[7] of the TOSG equation (1) 
within the Games of Timing Optimal Strategy and Optimal 
Timing Interval Kernel equation [23] is crucial to the final 
Optimal Decision (TOSG) Protocol equation.  The Optimal 
Strategy Timing Interval enables the Optimal Decision with 
the computations of parameters correlated to the TOSG 
Protocol Equation constraint solutions for (1) perceived threat, 
(2) threat missile, and (3) ground asset being attacked. 
Denman[7] in the research on invariant imbedding and optimal 
control stresses the “concept of optimizing the performance, 
yield or profit of a system.” The optimization equation that 
Denman utilizes is a Linear Regulatory control problem 
equation. This optimization equation, i.e., Lagrangian, uses the 
invariant imbedding concept to completely define the 
performance of the Linear Regulator control system.  
Also, a test for the  integration error is made by Denman’s 
two resulting equations from a coupled set of first-order 
differential equations leads to a two point boundary problem. 
The use of the invariant imbedding concept contains the 
TOSG Protocol equation within the optimization solution for 
the three constraints into the Kernel of the Games of Timing 
Optimal Strategy and Optimal Timing Interval. The Games of 
Timing Theory[26] definition of the Optimal Strategy and the 
Optimal Timing Interval states they are obtained as the 
solution of a certain integral equation with a positive kernel. In 
a wide category of cases this integral equation is equivalent to 
a certain linear differential equation or a system of linear first 
order differential equations. The Optimal Strategy will be 
obtained as the solution of a certain integral equation with a 
positive kernel[7]. 
V. GAMES OF TIMING OPTIMAL STRATEGY AND 
OPTIMAL TIMING INTERVAL (MODEL 3) 
1.  Definition of Symmetric Game of Timing 
The Symmetric Game of Timing [26] is a continuous 
game involving the Bilinear functional 
                1  1 
             0∫0∫K(x,y)dF(x)dG(y),K(x,y) =  - K(y,x)                (8) 
2. OPTIMUM PURE STRATEGY DEFINITION 
For x < y, K(x,y) is a strictly increasing function of x and 
a strictly decreasing function of y [26]. If K(1
-
,1) ≤ 0, there is 
an optimal pure strategy at 1; if K(0,1) ≥ 0, there is an optimal 
pure strategy at 0. It will be proved there is a unique optimal 
strategy which is either a density from some point a to 1, or is 
a jump at 0 and a density from a to 1. If the quantity K(x
-
,y) 
varies in sign as y varies, let b be the value such that K(b
-
,b) = 
0 while K(y
-
,y) > 0 for b < y ≤ 1. The optimal strategy y is a 
density from a to 1 where a > b.  It is shown that the 
determination of the density function depends on the solution 
of a certain integral equation with positive kernel, and the 
theory of such integral equations.  It is shown for a general 
category of cases the optimal strategy can be obtained in terms 
of a system of ordinary linear differential equations. The proof 
of the uniqueness of an optimal strategy can be given in the 
following simpler form. If there are two optimal strategies, 
they must have the same spectrum. 
3. SYMMETRIC CONTINUOUS GAMES DEFINITION 
The equations considered are a class of Symmetric 
Continuous Games involving the bilinear function[26], 
                             1    1 
                        0∫ 0∫ K(x,y)dF(x)dG(y)                         (9) 
 
where x,y range over the real numbers from 0 to 1 inclusive, 
the symmetry of the game reflecting itself in the skew 
symmetry of the kernel K(x,y) [26], 
                          K(x,y) =  - K(y,x)                                       (10) 
 
Concerning the kernel K(x,y), suppose that for x < y, K(x,y) is 
a strictly increasing function of x and a strictly decreasing 
function of y. This property holds for x > y by virtue of the 
skew-symmetry of K(x,y). Across the main diagonal x = y this 
property may cease, i.e., there may be a jump of K(x,y), and 
K(a+δ, a) may be smaller than K(a-δ, a) for small positive δ’s. 
4. FORMAL DEFINITION OF A GAME OF TIMING 
Such a Game is a Game of Timing by virtue of the 
following interpretation. The variables x and y may represent 
the times at which players I and II take certain specific 
actions; and it is profitable for each player to delay action as 
long as possible, provided its action is prior to its opponent’s 
action. If the time x, y at which players I,II take action are near 
each other, there is a decided difference in the outcome 
accordingly as x < y or x > y. Each player is thus subject to the 
following motive: it wishes to delay action so as to increase its 
reward, but at the same time not to delay so long that its 
opponent can with effectiveness precede it.  
5. SYMMETRIC GAME OF TIMING 
A Game will be a symmetric game of timing[19]if the 
kernel K(x,y) satisfies the following conditions: 
K(x,y)   =            A(x,y) for x < y 
0 for x = y 
                                                   -A(x,y) for x > y 
where A(x,y) is continuous in x ≤ y. 
A(x,y) is a strictly increasing function of x and a strictly 
decreasing function of  y. 
A(x,y) has continuous first derivative in x ≤  y and the set of 
points where Ax(x,y) = 0 or Ay(x,y) = 0 contains no linear 
intervals , x = constant. 
                   β1 <  y  < β 2  or y = constant, α1< x < α2 
                  Ax(x,y) ≥  0,       Ay(x,y)  ≤  0  for x ≤  y 
6. OPTIMAL STRATEGY OF A GAME OF TIMING DEFINITION 
The condition for A(x,y) makes a limit on places where 
either of these derivatives are zero. The optimal strategy of a 
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game of timing is unique and consists either of (1) a density 
function from some point a to 1 or, (2) consists of a jump at 0 
and a density from some point a to 1 [26]. 
7. SOLUTION OF A GAME OF TIMING WITH AN INTEGRAL 
EQUATION 
The optimal strategy[7] will be obtained as the solution of 
a certain integral equation with a positive kernel. In a wide 
category of cases this integral equation is equivalent to a 
certain linear differential equation or a system of linear first 
order differential equations[7 ]. 
8. GENERAL CONDITIONS ON AN OPTIMUM STRATEGY FOR 
GAMES OF TIMING 
 
If A(1,1) ≤  0   a pure strategy at 1 is the unique optimum 
strategy 
If A(0,1) ≥  0  a pure strategy at 0 is the unique optimum 
strategy 
 Suppose, A(0,1) < 0,  A( 1,1) > 0, and that there is an optimal 
strategy F(x) for the game, and derive necessary conditions 
satisfied by F(x). Then, [26] 
                 1 
   V (y) = ∫0  K(x,y) dF(x) ≥  0  for all y                            (11) 
 
while, 
       1                              1    1 
   ∫0  V (y) dF(y)   =  ∫0 ∫0  K(x,y) dF(x)dF(y) = 0 
 
By the skew-symmetry of K(x,y).                                       (12)  
9. THE GAMES OF  TIMING SOLUTION FOR TWO OPTIMAL 
STRATEGIES AND OPTIMAL STRATEGY TIMING INTERVAL EXISTS 
IF THEY HAVE THE SAME SPECTRUM.  
  The spectrum of F(x) lies completely in the basic interval b ≤ 
x ≤ 1. This makes an assertion only if b > 0. A new game 
exists where the pay-off is K(x,y), but where x,y are limited to 
the interval b ≤ x ≤ 1, b ≤ y ≤ 1. This game of timing has a 
solution. Assuming the solution to this game will be φ(x), b ≤ 
x ≤ 1, with  φ (1) = 1, φ (b) = 0. Then extend φ (x) below b by 
setting φ (x) = 0, for x < b. This contradiction establishes that 
only the game must be considered over the basic interval  b ≤ 
x ≤ 1. Therefore only the basic interval, the timing interval  
will be considered for this basic interval. This basic interval 
will be the interval from 0 to 1, so that it is stated, 
                        A(x,y) > 0  for  0 < x ≤  1                             (13) 
 
Thus, it has been proven that if there are two optimal 
strategies, they must both have the same spectrum.  
VI. TOSG PROTOCOL DECISION OPTIMIZATION EQUATION 
The basic concept required is for the MOP bomber to 
make a decision to allocate sensor and weapon systems to 
threat launch events. The constraints on this decision are (1) 
perceived threat inventory, (2) threat missile, and (3) ground 
asset being attacked. Therefore the TOSG Protocol equation to 
Allocate Sensor and Weapon Systems Decisions[21] as the 
Objective Function, which will be invariant imbedded[7] 
within the kernel equation for the Games of Timing theory to 
obtain the Optimal Strategy time interval  is stated as: 
TOSG = ASWR+[ α[PTI-PTIc] + β[TM -TMc] + 
                                                               γ[GAA-GAAc] ]   (14) 
ASWD = Allocate Sensor And Weapon Systems to Threat 
                Launch Events Objective Function 
PTI = Perceived Threat Inventory Constraint,  
PTIc = PTI constraint value with risk 
TM = Threat Missile Constraint,  
TMc = TM constraint value with risk 
GAA = Ground Asset Being Attacked,  
GAAc = GAA constraint value with risk 
α = PTI Lagrange Multiplier, β = TM Lagrange Multiplier 
γ = GAA Lagrange Multiplier 
 
The Lagrangian Optimization of the TOSG equation with 
objective function ASWR for each of the three constraints will 
be mathematically derived by obtaining the partial derivative 
of TOSG with respect to each of the three constraints and 
equating the expression to zero to enable a Lagrange 
Multiplier solution for each of the constraints. The risk 
equations[3,13] are included within the three TOSG Protocol 
optimization equation constraint equations. Then, a solution 
for the TOSG Protocol equation containing the constraint 
values can be achieved. The invariant imbedding[7] of 
equation (14) within the Games of Timing Optimal Strategy 
and Optimal Timing Interval Kernel equation is crucial to the 
final Decision Optimization equation. The Optimal Strategy 
Timing Interval enables the Optimal TOSG Decision with the 
computation of parameters correlated to the constraint 
solutions for (1) perceived threat, (2) threat missile, and (3) 
ground asset being attacked. Refer to Figure 2 for the Optimal 
TOSG Protocol Decision Equation Flow Chart. Figure 3 
illustrates the theoretical Performance Analysis of the Three 
TOSG Protocol Models. 
VI. SUMMARY 
         
The TOSG Protocol Cockpit Software is theoretically 
developed for optimal control performance of the MOP 
bomber. The TOSG Protocol is composed of tactical game 
theory as a Zero Sum Two Person game and its 
interconnection to optimal strategy, aiming and evasion and 
games of timing theory. Three topological models with their 
correlated game theory basis are included in the TOSG 
optimization equation with risk constraints. The TOSG 
Protocol Game Tree Geometric Cockpit Software Structure 
represents the transit of the nuclear devices in the tunnel and 
the MOP bomber activity for the three models.    
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